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SURVEY SECTION
Taxation. Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services, Ltd. v.
Clark, 676 A.2d 1357 (R.I. 1996). Two percent tax on gross premi-
ums received by out-of-state insurer for insurance sold in Rhode
Island did not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution.'
If an out-of-state insurance company does not maintain a
physical presence in the state, there is a question as to whether a
tax on the premiums it receives for policies sold within the state
violates its due process rights. In Associated Electric & Gas Insur-
ance Services, Ltd. v. Clark,2 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that taxing premiums received by an out-of-state insurer did
not violate due process, because the requirement of physical pres-
ence was met when the insurer "purposefully availed" itself of the
Rhode Island economic market.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services, Ltd. (AEGIS),
a Bermuda corporation, sold excess-liability insurance to four
Rhode Island natural gas utility companies, 4 but did not file the
required gross premium tax returns for the years 1985 through
1990. 5 Although AEGIS was not licensed or authorized to issue
insurance in Rhode Island, such licensure or authorization was not
a prerequisite for tax liability in the state.6 Even though the in-
sured utility companies contacted AEGIS, and no AEGIS repre-
sentatives ever came to Rhode Island, the tax administrator
determined that the insurance contracts were business transac-
tions subject to tax, because the properties and risks were located
1. The tax was imposed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section 44-
17-1, which authorizes a tax of two percent on the gross premiums on insurance
contracts covering property and risks within the state, sold by "domestic, foreign,
or alien insurance compan[ies] . .. transacting business in [Rhode Island]." RlI.
Gen. Laws § 44-17-1 (1995). The only exceptions are companies that sell ocean
marine insurance, see id. § 44-17-6, and fraternal benefit societies, see / § 27-25-1
(1994).
2. 676 A.2d 1357 (II. 1996).
3. Id. at 1361.
4. The four companies were Providence Energy, Valley Resources, South
County Gas, and Bristol and Warren Gas Company. AEGIS actually sold the pre-
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in Rhode Island.7 AEGIS appealed the tax administrator's deter-
ruination to the district court, which upheld the assessment.8 AE-
GIS then filed a petition for certiorari to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court which was granted.9
BACKGROUND
Rhode Island General Laws section 44-17-1 states that
"[elvery domestic, foreign, or alien insurance company, mutual as-
sociation, organization, or other insurer" must file an annual tax
return, and pay a two percent tax on the gross premiums received
for insurance contracts covering "property and risks within the
state, written during the calendar year." However, in State Board
of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp.,' 0 the United States
Supreme Court held that a five percent premium tax imposed by
Texas on a nonresident insured violated the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution.:" In Todd Shipyards, the Court
noted that the "transactions took place entirely outside Texas...
all losses arising under the policies were adjusted and paid outside
[the state,] . . . the insurers were not 'licensed to do business in
Texas, [had] no office... [there and did] not solicit business... [or]
investigate risks or claims in Texas.'"' 2 Todd Shipyards followed
Allgeyer v. Louisiana'3 and its progeny, which invalidated state
taxes on out-of-state insurance companies that were not licensed to
do business in the state, and had no office or agents in the state.14
In one case, a tax imposed on reinsurance premiums paid out-of-
state was invalidated, "even though both insurance companies
were authorized to do business in [the state]."15 However, these
cases have not been uniformly followed by state supreme courts,
and a number of cases have upheld taxation of out-of-state insur-
7. Id. at 1358-59. The gross premiums on which the two percent tax was
assessed totaled $3,378,335. Id at 1361.
8. Id. at 1358.
9. Id.
10. 370 U.S. 451 (1962).
11. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Associated Elec., 676 A.2d at 1359-60 (quot-
ing Todd Shipyards, 370 U.S. at 457).
12. Associated Elec., 676 A.2d at 1360 (quoting Todd Shipyards, 370 U.S. at
454-55).
13. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).




ers which conducted their business within the states solely by
mail.16
ANALYsIS AiN HOLDING
In arguing that the tax was unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause, AEGIS relied on Todd Shipyards, and claimed
that a state court could not "erode or modify decisions by the
United States Supreme Court."17 While agreeing with that gen-
eral proposition, the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that vari-
ous state cases, holding that out-of-state insurance companies
could be taxed under certain circumstances, had been dismissed by
the United States Supreme Court "for lack of a substantial federal
question, which constituted a determination on the merits."'8
Thus, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled, "it appears that the
maintenance of an office or agents within the state is not a neces-
sary prerequisite to the exercise of the power of taxation."19 How-
ever, the court had more to rely on than a mere inference that
could be drawn from" the refusal of the United States Supreme
Court to hear the state tax cases.20 In Quill Corp. v. North Da-
kota,21 the United States Supreme Court held that the right of a
state to tax a company under the Due Process Clause does not de-
pend on the physical presence of that company within the state,
which is required under the Commerce Clause.22 The Court held
that "if a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the bene-
16. Id. (citing Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n v. State Bd. of Equalization,
671 P.2d 349 (Cal. 1983), appeal dismissed, 466 U.S. 933 (1984); People v. United
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 427 P.2d 199 (Cal. 1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 330 (1967);
Ministers Life & Casualty Union v. Haase, 141 N.W.2d 287 (Wis. 1966), appeal





21. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
22. Associated Eke., 676 A.2d at 1360-61 (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 303-07).
The Court rejected its decision in a prior case, National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), where it had held that physical presence was
"a prerequisite to the right to tax pursuant to the due-process clause." Id at 1361.
In overruling Bellas Hess on that issue, the Court used the reasoning it had ap-
plied in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), where it found
that a state court had in personam and in rem jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion that "purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the
forum state." Id (quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at 307-08).
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fits of an economic market in the forum state, it may subject itself
to the state's in personam jurisdiction even though it has no physi-
cal presence in that state."23 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
noted that the clear holding in Quill "superseded" Todd Shipyards,
and was consistent with the state tax cases that "purported to dis-
tinguish [Todd Shipyards]."24
Once the court determined that Quill represented the appro-
priate standard by which to judge whether AEGIS was liable for
the premium tax, it found that "[a] foreign insurer who manages to
collect millions of dollars in premiums ... creates a purposeful eco-
nomic presence in the state."25 The court also noted that an insur-
ance claim by the utilities might require that AEGIS send
personnel into Rhode Island to investigate, in which case "service
of process could be made validly upon AEGIS within this state for
any dispute arising out of [the insurance]." 26
CONCLUSION
After Associated Electric, a foreign insurer doing significant
business in Rhode Island will most certainly be held liable for state
taxes on premiums it receives for insurance policies covering risks
within the state. However, it is unlikely that this holding will be
limited to insurers, since the same criteria can be applied to almost
any type of business. Annual premiums of about $500,000 per
year "create[d] a purposeful economic presence in the state,"2 7 but
at what level will there not be such a presence? Where will the
court draw the line, and on what basis? Or is there an implicit
invitation in this holding for the legislature to do so?
Renee G. Vogel, MD, MPH
23. Id. at 1361 (quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at 307-08).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1361-62 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985)).
27. Id. at 1361.
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Taxation. Koch Fuels, Inc. v. Clark, 676 A.2d 330 (R.I. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 301 (1996). Gross-earnings tax on sales of fuel
oil by out-of-state seller did not violate the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution, and the seller was an "importer"
within the meaning of the Rhode Island Gross-Earnings Tax Act.
Under the Commerce Clause,1 foreign corporations are not lia-
ble for state sales tax unless their activities and the statute in
question meet certain standards articulated by the United States
Supreme Court.2 In Koch Fuels, Inc. v. Clark,3 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court upheld a tax on fuel oil sold by a foreign corpora-
tion for use in Rhode Island, finding that the corporation's activi-
ties and the statute met the requisite tests.4
FACTS AN TRAVEL
Between 1982 and 1984, Koch Fuels, Inc. (Koch), a Delaware
corporation headquartered in Wichita, Kansas, sold 25.6 million
gallons of fuel oil worth 18 million dollars to New England Power,
the parent company of Narragansett Electric (Narragansett) for
use in Narragansett's electrical generating plant located in Provi-
dence.5 The oil originated in either Texas, Pennsylvania or Massa-
chusetts, and was shipped via common carrier into the Port of
Providence.6 None of the negotiations for the sales contracts oc-
curred in Rhode Island, and invoices were sent to, and paid from,
Massachusetts.7 Although Koch was registered to do business in
Rhode Island, and paid Rhode Island corporate taxes in the years
in which it sold fuel oil, it had no employees within the state, and
did not rent, lease or own real property in Rhode Island.8 The
terms of the fuel oil contracts were "f.o.b. Providence,"9 thus title,
possession and risk of loss passed from Koch to Narragansett in
1. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
2. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (articulating the
standards).
3. 676 A.2d 330 (R.I. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 301 (1996).





9. The term f.o.b. means "free on board" at some location, e.g., Providence. It
is a delivery term requiring the seller to ship the goods and bear the expense and
risk of loss to the f.o.b. point designated. Since delivery and payment are made at
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Providence.' 0 The sales to Narragansett were Koch's only business
contacts with any entity in Rhode Island."i
In 1988, the Rhode Island Division of Taxation (Tax Division)
issued a notice-of-deficiency determination to Koch for five of the
six fuel oil sales it made to Narragansett. 12 Koch made a timely
request for an administrative hearing, after which the tax admin-
istrator issued a final order affirming the assessment.' 3 Koch filed
for de novo review of the decision in the district court.14 The dis-
trict court affirmed the assessment, and Koch filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which was
granted.15
BACKGROUND
When faced with a constitutional challenge to a statute, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court begins with the assumption that leg-
islatures are presumed to act within their "constitutional limits"
when they enact legislation.16 In Seibert v. Clark,17 an out-of-state
trucking company claimed that a decal fee imposed only on out-of-
state truckers violated the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.' 8 In Seibert, the Rhode Island Supreme Court relied
primarily on Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,'9 as it did in the
instant case. The court noted that the challenger in a taxation
case must overcome the presumption of constitutionality and prove
that the tax was unconstitutional 'beyond a reasonable doubt."20
When a tax is challenged under the Commerce Clause, the
United States Supreme Court determines whether the state has
the f.o.b. location, that is also the location where title usually passes. Black's Law
Dictionary 444 (6th ed. 1990); UCC § 2-319.
10. Koch Fuels, 676 A.2d at 332.
11. Id.
12. The Tax Division issued the notice-of-deficiency pursuant to a statute that
provided for an "an annual tax rate of one percent (1%) of gross earnings... de-
rived ... from the sale of petroleum products in this state." RM. Pub. Laws ch. 9,
art. 6, § 1 (repealed 1986), quoted in Koch Fuels, 676 A.2d at 332.
13. Koch Fuels, 676 A.2d at 332.
14. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-8-24 (1995).
15. Koch Fuels, 676 A.2d at 332.
16. Seibert v. Clark, 619 A-2d 1108, 1113 (ILI. 1993) (citations omitted).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
20. Seibert, 619 A.2d at 1113 (citations omitted).
SURVEY SECTION
unduly burdened interstate commerce, or whether it simply has
taken its "fair share" of the expenses. 2' Complete Auto Transit es-
tablished the four part test by which a state or local tax is evalu-
ated under the Commerce Clause.z2 Under this test, there must
exist a substantial nexus between the taxed activity and the taxing
state, the tax must be fairly apportioned, the tax may not discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce, and the tax must be fairly re-
lated to the services provided by the taxing state.2 3
ANAiysis AN HOLDING
As a threshold matter, the Rhode Island Supreme Court deter-
mined whether the "gross-earnings" tax was really a "sales or use
tax," despite the caption and wording of the statute.24 The court
noted that even though the statute was entitled, "Gross Earnings
Tax of Petroleum Companies," it was actually a sales tax, as de-
fined by the statute, because it covered only the transactions occur-
ring in Rhode Island, whereas a true "gross earnings" tax would
have included out-of-state transactions as well.2 5 In so holding,
the court relied on Complete Auto Transit, where the United States
Supreme Court noted that, in construing state tax statutes, it con-
sidered the practical effect of the statute, not the formal
language.26
The Rhode Island Supreme Court next evaluated the tax
under the Commerce Clause test announced in Complete Auto
Transit. First, in finding that Koch's fuel oil sales in Rhode Island
constituted a substantial nexus with the state, the court agreed
that the standard required a physical presence, as articulated by
the United States Supreme Court in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.2 7
21. John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 8.11, at 303
(4th ed. 1991).
22. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
23. Koch Fuels v. Clark, 676 A.2d 330, 333 (ILI. 1996) (citing Complete Auto
Transit, 430 U.S. at 279).
24. Id.
25. "Gross sales" is defined as "earnings from sales of tangible personal prop-
erty. . where shipments are made to points within the state . . .[but] does not
include those earnings from sales to out-of-state customers for marketing, distribu-
tion or consumption outside this state." 1982 Pub. Laws clh 9, art. 6, § 1 (repealed
1986), quoted in Koch Fuels, 676 A.2d at 333.
26. Koch Fuels, 676 A.2d at 333 (citing Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at
279).
27. 504 U.S. 298, 314 (1992).
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that Koch's activities rose
to the level of a physical presence in Rhode Island because Koch
retained control over the oil until it reached Narragansett's termi-
nus in Providence, including the right to cancel before delivery,
and the oil was the entire and exclusive cargo of the common carri-
ers hired to bring it into Rhode Island.28
The second part of the Complete Auto Transit test requires the
tax to be fairly apportioned, so that interstate commerce is not un-
fairly burdened.29 If both internal and external consistency exists,
the tax is fairly apportioned.3 0 To be internally consistent, an en-
tity must not be subject to multiple taxation if every state were to
impose an identical tax.31 Since the statute applied only to fuel-oil
sales actually made in Rhode Island, the court found that even if
every state imposed the identical tax, there could be only one tax
on each sale.3 2 To be externally consistent, the tax must be rea-
sonably related to the in-state component of the taxed activity.33
On this issue, Koch argued that its sales in Rhode Island included
numerous activities that occurred outside the state, and was there-
fore unfairly apportioned, unless adjusted.34 The court disagreed
that the tax was unfair, and stated that under the United States
Supreme Court's holding in American Trucking Ass'n v.
Scheiner,35 a state is not required to adopt a tax that is adminis-
tratively burdensome.3 6
Addressing the third question, whether the tax discriminated
against interstate commerce, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that the party challenging the constitutionality of a taxing
statute has the burden to produce evidence of its discriminatory
effect.3 7 After reviewing the record, the supreme court held that
there was no evidence that the tax favored Rhode Island petroleum
companies at the expense of out-of-state companies; thus, Koch
had failed to meet its burden on this issue.3 8
28. Koch Fuels, 676 A.2d at 334.
29. Id (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 313).
30. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262).
34. Id. at 334-35.
35. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
36. Koch Fuels, 676 A.2d at 335 (citing American Trucking, 483 U.S. at 296).
37. Id. (citing Seibert v. Clark, 619 A.2d 1108, 1116 (R.I. 1993)).
38. Id.
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The fourth part of the Complete Auto Transit test requires that
the tax be "fairly related to the presence and activities of the tax-
payer within the state."3 9 Koch argued that because it had no em-
ployees or property in Rhode Island, it did not benefit from the tax
revenues. 40 The supreme court first noted that the purpose of this
test was to limit the reach of a state's taxing authority in order to
avoid undue burdens on interstate commerce. 41 The court dis-
agreed that Koch received no benefits from Rhode Island, pointing
out that the state provided shipping facilities, and had emergency
equipment in case of an oil spill, which was a real risk, considering
that Koch had shipped 25.6 million gallons of oil into Rhode Island
over a three year period.42
In its final argument, Koch insisted that it was not an "im-
porter" within the meaning of the statute, because an importer is
the recipient of the goods. 43 On this point, the court held that the
language of the statute clearly defined an "importer" as an entity
in the "business of importing or causing to be imported."44 Having
found that Koch fit the definition of the entity to be taxed under
the statute, the court held that the statute did not violate the Com-
merce Clause because it was fairly apportioned, did not discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce, and was fairly related to the
activities being taxed. Finally, the court found a substantial nexus
between Koch's activities and Rhode Island that amounted to a
physical presence; thus, as applied to Koch, the tax did not violate
the Commerce Clause.45
CONCLUSION
Even though the statute at issue in this case had been re-
pealed by the time Koch came before the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, the court's analysis is important as a guide to future chal-
lenges to a taxation statute under the Commerce Clause. Koch is
consistent with the court's analysis in Seibert, and emphasizes
that out-of-state companies with more than an incidental tie to
39. Id.
40. Id
41. Id. (citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992)).
42. Id- at 335-36.
43. Id. at 336.
44. Id- (quoting 1982 IL. Pub. Laws ch. 9, art. 6, § 1 (repealed 1986)).
45. Id at 333.
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Rhode Island will be not be exempted from paying Rhode Island
sales and use taxes.
Renee G. Vogel, MD, MPH
